Ownership structure is considered to be the most influential component in corporate govern-ance; it is also closely related to firm performance. The current research analyzes the effect of ownership structure (both insider ownership-board and managerial ownership, blockholder ownership-and institutional ownership concentrationpressure-insensitive and pres-sure-sensitive) on firm performance (industry adjusted return on asset/IAROA) based on its life cycle. Life cycle is incorporated into the research to examine whether the effect of own-ership structure on firm performance differs at each stage of the life cycle. The current re-search uses imbalanced panel data consisting of 695 observations of sample firms from the manufacturing, IT, and multimedia firms during the 2005-2010 period. The results show that: (1) insider ownership has a significantly non-linear influence on IAROA, indicated by a U-shaped curve (2) blockholders have a significantly positive effect on IAROA in firms at the mature stage; on the contrary, the effect is significantly negative in firms at the growth stage (3) institutional ownership concentration has a significantly negative effect on IAROA across the samples and a significantly positive effect on firms at the mature stage, and (4) pressure-insensitive and pressuresensitive institutional ownerships have a positive and sig-nificant effect on IAROA in firms at the mature stage; on the contrary, the effect is negative and significant in firms at the growth stage..
acknowledged (Solomon, 2007; Liang et al., 2011) .
According to Parkinson, corporate governance is a supervisory and control process intended to ensure Vol. 5 | No. 3 ISSN: 2089-6271 How Ownership Structure Influences Firm Performance in Relation to Its Life Cycle that the firm management acts in accordance with the stockholders' interest (Solomon, 2007) .
In the preamble to Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), corporate governance is deemed as a key element in improving the efficiency of economy and growth (Holm and Schøler, 2008) . Agency problems arise from the relationship between stockholders and managers, due to a conflict of interests in the firm (Fazlzadeh et al., 2011) . The conflict of interests eventually leads to agency cost. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency cost as the overall cost that includes the monitoring expenses paid for by the principals, expenses for firm relations with agents, and residual losses. In theoretical literature, there are six mechanisms to keep agency cost under control in the corporate governance process (Fazlzadeh et al., 2011) . Perrini et al., (2008) confirms that the effect of ownership structure on firm performance has become an important subject and an ongoing topic of debate in the financial literature. It begins with the research conducted by Berle and Means (1932) and Chandler (1962) as quoted by Perrini et al., (2008) on the connection between ownership concentration and firm performance, as well as the actual role of the management. Basically there are two dimensions in ownership structure:
insider ownership or managerial ownership and institutional ownership. Morck et al., (1988) studied the connection between managerial ownership and the firm market value, and the connection is non-monotonic in nature.
Insider or managerial ownership is essentially a method to reduce agency cost (Crutchley and Hansen, 1989) . Rose (2005) confirms that, in order to synchronize the interest of the management and that of investors from outside the firm, incentive is provided for the managers, in that the management becomes a co-owner of the firm. Incentive for managers in the form of stock ownership is expected to reduce agency cost. The managers will implement policies that conform to firm objectives, namely maximizing the values of stockholders, including the managers themselves.
Meanwhile, Pound (1988) studied the effect of institutional ownership on firm performance (Liang et al., 2011 Unlike in previous researches, Liang et al., (2011) examined the role of ownership structure on firm performance by taking into account the firm's life In categorizing the firms based on their life cycles, the current researcher uses variables that refer to Ramaswamy et al., (2008) , Liang and Lin (2008) , and Liang et al., (2011) (see Table 1 ). Liang et al., (2011) , the use of Tobins' Q and ROA have weaknesses.
In the developing countries, accounting standard is not applied well and the profit rate may not be absolutely accurate to measure firm performance (Wiwattanakantang, 2001) . However, ROA can be used as the measurement of firm performance because ROA focuses on the current performance.
Meanwhile, Tobins' Q reflects growth opportunities or expectations of the firms' prospects in the future years and Tobins' Q regression would be more susceptible to endogeneity problems (Cornett et al., 2007) . In addition, the control variables are firm size (NLA-natural logarithm of asset), leverage (LERliabilities to equity ratio), research expenditures rate (RD-R&D expenditures to sales), marketing expenditure rate (ME-marketing expenditures to sales), and asset growth rate (AG-asset growth divided the current net assets).
The current research uses two research models:
This model is used to examine the effect of insider and institutional ownership on firm performance.
The use of INSID2 is to test the non linear relationship between insider ownership and firm performance as stated on the previous studies.
Furthermore, the second model is similar to the first model. However, each type of ownership structure is divided into its categories, Model 2 range it is noted at 5%; on the 5%-25% range noted at 20%; and on the more than 25% range noted at 2%. The examination shows that a 0-5% ownership has a positive effect, 5%-25% ownership a negative effect, and more than 25% ownership a positive effect. This indicates that 0-5% and more than 25% ownerships tend toward the convergence of interest hypothesis, while the 5%-25% ownership tends toward the entrenchment effect hypothesis.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Institutional ownership (INS) in the current
research refers to the concentration of institutional ownership calculated using the Herfindahl Index.
In all the samples in Model 1, the INS coefficient is -0.0497 which is significant on the 1% level; profit margin begin to decrease, the strategy taken to prevent this is to distribute a larger share of managerial ownership. Therefore, managers will strive to improve firm performance in order to obtain greater returns. On the contrary, in firms at the growth stage where the sales and profit margin are high, a larger managerial ownership will reduce firm performance. Blockholder ownership will result in entrenchment, in which managers or agents are able to expropriate the wealth of minority stockholders (Thomsen et al., 2006; Morck et al., 1988) .
On the split of institutional ownership for all the samples, INSPRI has a negative and insignificant effect with a coefficient of -0.0140 (t-stat = 0.7936).
Otherwise, INSPRS has a negative and significant effect at 5% level. This result is consistent with Bhattacharaya and Graham (2007) . Pressuresensitive investors are less willing to against management decisions and to follow them because they want to protect their business relations.
When the investors just follow the management, they can not monitor well. This result is consistent with strategic-alignment hypothesis (Pound, 1988, in McConnell and Servaes, 1990) .
In (2000) and Faccio and Lasfer (2000) . According to these researches, INSPRI and INSPRS have a dubious monitoring role; in other words, in firms at the growth stage, both types of institutional investors do not play a significant role in monitoring. Ramaswamy et al., (2008) confirms that a growing firm usually has not had a good corporate governance system just yet.
The reason is that the firm is usually focused on product innovation, organizational and managerial practices, profitability monitoring, and customers;
neither is their managerial hierarchy effective as yet. Therefore, the firm tends to be occupied in finding an organizational structure that fits and with Liang et al., (2011) and Cornett et al., (2007) .
On the mature firms, both market and customers perform relatively good (stable condition) so corporate governance framework can be applied.
Besides, organization structure and management system of mature firms are not flat and hierrarchically has been etablished very well. As the implication, good corporate governance really needed (Ramaswamy, 2008 (t-stat = 0.2142), but they are not significant.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
Insider ownership has a significant effect on firm performance. Therefore, the stock compensation becomes an option to reduce the agency costs or to increase firm performance. However, there are things to consider, namely there is a point where insider ownership can reduce firm performance. 
